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Abstract— Multi-user multi-keyword ranked search scheme 
in arbitrary language is a novel multi-keyword rank searchable 
encryption (MRSE) framework based on Paillier Cryptosystem 
with Threshold Decryption (PCTD). Compared to previous 
MRSE schemes constructed based on the k-nearest neighbor 
searchable encryption (KNN-SE) algorithm, it can mitigate some 
drawbacks and achieve better performance in terms of function-
ality and efficiency. Additionally, it does not require a predefined 
keyword set and support keywords in arbitrary languages. How-
ever, due to the pattern of exact matching of keywords in the new 
MRSE scheme, multilingual search is limited to each language 
and cannot be searched across languages.  In this paper, we pro-
pose a cross-lingual multi-keyword rank search (CLRSE) scheme 
which eliminates the barrier of languages and achieves semantic 
extension with using the Open Multilingual Wordnet. Our 
CLRSE scheme also realizes intelligent and personalized search 
through flexible keyword and language preference settings. We 
evaluate the performance of our scheme in terms of security, 
functionality, precision and efficiency, via extensive experiments. 
Keywords—Cloud computing; searchable encryption; seman-
tic search; privacy-preserving; top-k 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Today, cloud computing [1] has become a mature compu-
ting model which provides scalable and virtualized computing 
resources over the Internet. Cloud storage is a cloud 
computing system mainly used for data storage and 
management. Specifically, cloud storage is a new approach 
for providing storage resources on the cloud which brings 
great convenience for business and individual users[2-3]. 
The development of the cloud storage has been under the 
threats of various external and internal attacks. As a conse-
quence, encryption technologies are commonly used to secure 
the data stored in cloud. However, this causes new challenges 
on the utility of cloud storage. To address the problem, 
searchable encryption [4] has been leveraged as an effective 
way to search over encrypted data. The searchable encryption 
technique has developed from single keyword search to multi-
keyword ranked search. 
Cao et al. proposed a widely used multi-keyword search 
framework MRSE [5] which supports for sorting results. By 
leveraging KNN-SE algorithm [6], the relevance score be-
tween the secure index and the query trapdoor is calculated 
through coordinate matching[7-8]. Yang et al. presented a 
novel multi-user multi-keyword rank search scheme [9] which 
addresses some problems in the previous MRSE schemes. By 
utilizing PCTD algorithm, the new MRSE [9] supports arbi-
trary language, flexible authorization, time-controlled revoca-
tion, flexible preference settings and does not require a global 
dictionary. It can also achieve simultaneous search within mul-
tiple users’ documents using one single trapdoor. However, 
due to the exact match of keywords in their scheme, the multi-
lingual search is limited to each language. It is impossible to 
search across languages. Moreover, it fails to satisfy the re-
quirements for semantic search. Several papers (e.g., [10-14]) 
have studied related security issues. 
To solve the above problems, we propose our cross-lingual 
multi-keyword rank search (CLRSE) scheme. Contributions of 
our work are as follows: 
1) For the first time, we explore the problem of cross-
lingual multi-keyword ranked search over encrypted cloud 
data. In contrast to [9], we build a cross-lingual target query 
upon Open Multilingual WordNet (OMW) [15] through 
language conversion and semantic extension to the original 
query, which can better eliminate the language barriers in 
searchale encryption.  
2) Through flexible keyword and language preference 
settings, as well as automated calculation of preference scores 
for extended keywords according to the semantic , our scheme 
can achieve inteligent and personalized sorting search, and 
improve the accuracy of top-k search results. 
3) We evaluate the performance of our scheme in terms of 
security, functionality, percision and efficiency through 
extensive experiments.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, 
the problem formulation is given. In section III, our scheme is 
described in details. In section IV, the security analysis is stat-
ed. The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated in 
Section V. In Section VI, the paper is concluded. 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
A. System Model 
The architecture of our scheme is shown in Fig. 1. There 
are six entities: Data Owner (DO) provides documents to be 
outsourced and generates the secure index for each document. 
Key Generation Center (KGC) takes a security parameter as 
input to generate all parameters and keys in the system. Cloud 
Platform (CP) has strong storage and computation capabilities, 
and stores user’s files in the encrypted form. CP will also 
respond to users’ computation and data retrieval requests. 
Computing Service Provider (CSP) is an online server with 
powerful computation capabilities. It executes interactive 
computations with CP. Data User (DU) generates a keyword 
trapdoor and issues data retrieval request to CP Query 
Transform Server (QTS) is a user-side server which converts 
user's original query to the target query.  
B. Design Goals 
1) Cross-Lingual Search: Our CLRSE scheme should 
support cross-lingual search. The data user can issue queries 
in any language and specify the language type of the returned 
results.  
2) Query Semantic Extension: The queries in our scheme 
are semantically extended before the trapdoor gene- ration to 
contain more semantical information.  
3) Personalized Ranked Search: In our scheme, different 
users can specify scores for query keywords and languages 
according to their preferences. And the results will be sorted 
before returned to the data user.  
4) Security Goals:  We make the assumption that KGC is 
a fully trusted entity, CP and CSP are honest-but-curious, i.e., 
they are honest to execute the protocols but curious about 
users’ data and will attempt to deduce any useful information 
during operations. But they will not be compromised 
simultaneously. The security goals of our system are defined 
as follows: a). Confidentiality of outsourced data. Our scheme 
should be able to protect the confidentiality of documents, 
indexes, language information, file IDs and sysmentric keys. 
CP and CSP should not deduce any useful information from 
the uploaded tuples and encrypted documents. b). 
Unlinkability of query. Our scheme should ensure that even if 
the data user issues two identical queries, they can be 
transformed into two completely different trapdoors. CP and 
CSP cannot deduce the relationship between trapdoors. c). 
Privacy-Preserving. CP and CSP cannot learn any userful 
infomation from the returned results.  
 
Fig. 1. System Model 
C. Notations 
In table I, we list the notations used in CLRSE scheme. 
TABLE I.  NOTATIONS IN CLRSE 
Acronym Descriptions 
ipk   The public key of  data owner i. 
upk   The public key of data user. 
 isk   The secret key of data owner i. 
pk   The joint public key 
,i jF  The j-th document of iA   
,i jID   The identifier of ,i jF   
,i jK   The symmetric key of ,i jF   
,i jI   The secure index of ,i jF   
,i jla   The language tag of ,i jF   
   Strong secret key 
Td   Trapdoor 
Q  The data user’s search query 
D. Preliminaries 
1) PCTD (Paillier Cryptosystem with Threshold De- 
cryption) 
PCTD is a public key cryptosystem with addition homom- 
orphism and scalar multiplication homomorphism. The origi- 
nal double trapdoor public key cryptosystem (DT-PKC) [16] 
is a variant of Paillier’s [17] and is constructed based on two 
difficult problems: the factorization of the modulus and  
solving discrete logarithm. Derived from DT-PKC, PCTD 
splits the strong secret key into shares and achieves partial 
decryption mechanism which makes it suitable for search 
protocols over encrypted data. Due to the distributed weak 
decryption, it has also been widely used in multi-key 
environments. 
2) OMW (Open Multilingual Wordnet) 
Open Multilingual Wordnet [15] offers an open network in 
a variety of languages, all of which are associated with the 
Princeton Wordnet of English (PWN). It intends to make 
wordnets in multiple languages easy to use. It is linked to 
Princeton WordNet 3.0 and its data has been extracted and 
normalized,. The Open Multilingual Wordnet and its 
components are open: anyone can freely use, modify, and 
share them for any purpose. 
III.  CLRSE 
The CLRSE scheme is described in detail in this section. It 
operates in six phases: Initialization, Documents Outsourcing, 
Cross-Lingual query construction, Trapdoor Generation, Top-
k Rank Search. 
A. Initialization 
In this phase, the system is initialized. KGC takes security 
parameter l  as input and randomly chooses two prime 
numbers p  and q  whose bit length is l  . Then, KGC 
generates public parameter ( , )g N  by randomly selecting 
2
*
N
a Z  and computing N pq , 2 2modNg a N  . The 
master secret key   is ( 1, 1)lcm p q  . KGC splits   into 
two parts 1 and 2 using the master secret key splitting 
algorithm [5]. They are sent to CP and CSP through a secure 
channel, respectively. Each user i  possesses a pair of private 
key isk  and the corresponding public key i
sk
ipk g  . isk  is 
securely sent to user i . Finally, KGC generates a hash 
function : NH Z   which can map an element in NZ  to a 
symmetric key. 
B. Documents Outsourcing 
Step1 If data owner i  want to outsource his document 
,i jF  to the cloud, he should construct a secure index for the 
file. Firstly, the data owner extracts a set of keywords 1 2{ ,k k  
, ..., }nk  and assigns a tag la  such as ‘eng’ and ‘cmn’ which 
denotes the language information of the file. ‘eng’ and ‘cmn’ 
means that the document is in English and Chinese. In our 
scheme, we set the weight of the keyword as the product of 
TF IDF (Term Frequency and Inverse Document 
Frequency), such that each value is an element in 
NZ .  
Step2 Data owner i executes the keyword to unique (K2U) 
bigInteger protocol described in Algorithm 1. K2U protocol 
maps each keyword of multi-language into a unique big 
integer Nu Z .  
Algorithm 1: Keyword to Unique BigInteger Protocol 
(K2U) 
Input : keyword k  ( a string of length n) 
Output: big integer u   
1 Initialize  0u    
2 for 0i   to 1n   do : 
3         [ ] (hex) unicode  of  [ ]x i k i  
4         [ ] (dec) [ ]y i x i  
5         16[ ] [ ] 2 is i y i     
6          [ ]u u s i    
7 Return u   
As shown in Algorithm 1, each letter is represented by the 
hexadecimal Unicode and is converted to the decimal, then 
multiplied by the weight. The weight value of each letter is 
related to its location. 
Next, each integer is encrypted by the PCTD algorithm. 
The ciphertext [ ]
ipk
u encrypted with the owner’s public key 
ipk  is a binary group 1 2( , )U U , where 1
r
iU pk   
2(1 ) moduN N  , 22 modrU g N  and r  is randomly 
chosen from 2NZ  . The secure index of file ,i jF  is constructed 
as follows:  
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Step3 Data owner i chooses a number ,i j NK Z  and 
encrypts ,i jF  to ,,[ ] i ji jF   using symmetric encryption. The 
symmetric key ,i j  is generated by ,( )i jH K . Then, the data 
owner uploads the tuple 
,  , , , ,
{ ,  [ ] ,  [ ] ,  [ ] }
i j i i ii j i j pk i j pk i j pk
T I ID K la  together with the 
encrypted document to CP. 
C. Construction  of  Cross-Lingual query  
If a data user want to make a search, he selects a set of 
query keywords 1 2{ ,  ,  ... ,  }mQ qw qw qw  and assigns the 
preference scores of keywords as 1 2{ ,  ,  ... }mP    ， . 
Next, the user generates language tags 
1 2={ ,  ,  ... }tlq lq lq ，  which indicate the type of file lan-
guages that the user expects to receive and assigns preference 
scores 1 2{ ,  ,  ... , }l tP     to each type of languages. Then, 
the data user sends tuple ( ,  ,  ,   )lQ P P  to QTS. Upon recep-
tion of the tuple, QTS converts the original query into the 
target query through OMW. QTS constructs the cross-lingual 
target query in four steps: Language Conversion, Synonym 
Replacement, Reduction and Semantic Extension. 
Language Conversion and Synonym Replacement 
After receiving ( ,  ,  ,   )lQ P P  , QTS locates the WordNets 
of the corresponding languages according to  . For each 
keyword in Q , QTS search for it in OMW and replace each 
term with its synonym sets in the target languages. We set the 
preference score of each synonym as the product of the 
corresponding keyword score   and the language score   . 
Reduction If there are two or more keywords in the 
original query that belong to a synonym set, there will be 
duplicate synonym sets in the extended query. The redundant 
synonyms will be deleted to reduce the overhead while 
improving the search efficiency. The simplified cross-lingual 
query contains several non-intersecting synonym sets. 
Semantic extension In this step, we extend the simplified 
cross-lingual query semantically. In WordNet, if keywords are 
semantically related, they must have a certain kind of 
relationship such as synonym, hypernym/hyponym, 
meronym/holonomy. Through OMW, semantically related 
synonyms of each term are added into it. The similarity score  
of two terms 1 2( , )sim t t  can be easily obtained through OMW. 
For flexible control of the degree of semantic extension, we 
set a threshold (0 1)T T   , which is the minimum similarity 
score between existing synonym sets and extended semantic 
related keywords. ( 1T   means synonym replacement). 
Finally, we set the preference score of extended semantically 
related synonym   as the product of the corresponding 
synonym score    and the similarity score ( , )sim k s  .  
D. Trapdoor Generation 
After the construction of cross-lingual query is completed, 
the original query is transformed from a collection of 
individual keywords into a collection of synonyms. To 
generate a trapdoor, the data owner encrypts each keyword in 
the target query and their corresponding preference scores. 
The trapdoor can be constructed as follows:  
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E. Top-k Rank Search 
To issue a search request, the data user sends the trapdoor 
Td  and a parameter k  to CP. k  denotes the number of 
results the user wants to receive. In this phase, CP and CSP 
search over all documents in cloud  for results that match the 
query trapdoor and pick out the k  results with the highest 
relevance scores. The following protocols in [9] are utilized in 
our proposed scheme: 
Secure Addition Protocol across Domains (SAD):  
[ ]  [ ] [ ]  ( )
A Bpk pk pk A B
A B A B pk pk pk        
Secure Multiplication Protocol across Domains (SMD): 
[ ]  [ ] [ ]
A Bpk pk pk
A B A B      
Encrypted Keyword Equivalence Testing Protocol (KET): 
*[ ] ,  [ ]
A Bpk pk
A B u  ( * =1u  indicates that the two keywords 
are the same; * =0u  otherwise.  
Secure Top-k Data Retrieval Protocol across Domains 
(Top-k): 
1 2 max1 max 2 max( , ,..., , ) ( , ,... )n kT T T k T T T   
Step1 We apply the relevance score computation (RSC) 
protocol to calculate all relevance scores between search 
query and secure indexes. The details are described in 
Algorithm 2. 
The RSC protocol takes a set of index tuples of all 
documents and the trapdoor as inputs, and outputs a collection 
of relevance score tuples. In Algorithm 2, we initialize an 
empty set S to store the results.   
1) In line 3-6, it utilizes the KET protocol to compare 
each language tag [ ]
ipk
la  in the document with all language 
tags [ ]
upk
lq  in the trapdoor Td and the returned result is 
[ ]pkd  . Then, CP and CSP jointly execute the paritilal 
decryption algorithm to obtian d . If 1d  , the corresponding 
file is the target document we are searching for; 0d  , it is 
not. 
2) In line 7-16, it determines the product of the weight 
score ia  of keyword iak  and the preference score jt  of w .  
If iak w  , the relevance score of iak  and w is [ ] =i pks       
[ ]ia jt pk   since    
 
[ ]  ( ([ ] ,[ ] ) , [ '] )
 ( [1]  ,  [ ] )
i ui pk ia pk pk pk
pk ia jt pk
s SMD KET k w s
SMD  
 
 

    
Otherwise, [ ] =[0]i pk pks    since    
 
 
[ ]  ( ([ ] ,[ ] ) , [ '] )
 ( [0]  ,  [ ] )
i ui pk ia pk pk pk
pk ia jt pk
s SMD KET k w s
SMD  
 
 

    
Then，the relevance score is added into I: 
 [ ' ] [ ' ] [ ]i pk i pk i pkI I s      
3) In line 17, the tuple iS  is added into S . 
Step2 After the execution of RSC protocol, S stores all 
relevance score tuples that satisfy the data user’s requirements 
 
Algorithm 2: Relevance Score Computation Protocol 
Across Domains (RSC)
Input :  Index tuple set 1 2, ,..., nT T T   , trapdoor Td   
              where ( ,[ ] ,[ ] ,[ ] )
i i ii i i pk i pk i pk
T I ID K la  
             
1 2 1
2 1 2 31 2 ,
1 2
 ( , ,..., ), ([ ] ,[ ] )
( , ,..., ), ( ,..., ,[ ] )
([ ] ,[ ] ,...,[ ] ,[ ] )
i i
u
t u u u u
i i i in ia ia pk ia pk
n j j j jn j pk
j pk pk k pk pk
I I I I I k
Td Td Td Td Td s s s lq
s w w w


 
 

  
Output: relevance score tuple set 1 2 = < , ,...,  > mS S S S   
(m n)  
1 Initialize S     
2 for 1    i to n  do 
3       Initialize  [ ] [0]pk pkd    
4       for 2 1  j to n  do         
5             [ ] ([ ] ,[ ] )
u uj pk i pk j pk
d KET la lq    
6             [ ] ([ ] ,[ ]pk pk j pkd SAD d d     
7             CP and CSP jointly decrypts  [ ]pkd    
8             if d  equals 1 
9              for 2 1  j to n  
10                   3for  =1 to  dot n   
11                          for  each    in  
tj
w s  : 
12                             CP and CSP jointly calculate 
13                              [ ] ([ ] ,[ ] )
ui pk ia pki pk
u KET k w   
14                              [ ' ] ([ ] ,[ ] )
i ui pk ia pk jt pk
s SMD      
15                              [ ] ([ ] ,[ ' ] )i pk i pk i pks SMD u s     
16                              [ ' ] [ ' ] [ ]i pk i pk i pkI I s      
17                              ( [ ' ] ,[ ] ,[ ] )
i ii pk i pk i pk
S I ID K   
18 Return S   
 
for language. In this phase, CP and CSP take the collection of 
relevance score tuples S  and the parameter k as inputs, and 
executes the interactive privacy-preserving TOP-k protocol in 
[9]. The algorithm outputs k tuples max1 max 2 max, ,..., nT T T   
where max max max max([ ' ] ,[ ] ,[ ] )i i pk i pk i pkT I ID K    which have 
the k highest relevance scores. Finally, the tuples are returned 
to the data user. 
Step 3 Upon receiving the tuple set, the data user firstly 
recovers every max iID and max iK  in the tuples by computing 
max max
max max
2
1 2
1 2
([ ] , )
([ ] , )
( ([ ] , ) ( / mod );
( ) ( 1) / ;[ ] (C ,C )
i
i
i
i i pk
i i pk
sk
pk i
pk
ID Dec ID sk
K Dec ID sk
Dec m sk L C C N
L x x N m







  
  
Then, the data user acquires each document’s symmetric 
key by calculating 
max max( )i iH K  . The user can obtain the 
encrypted documents secretly by utilizing the Private Infor-
mation Retrieval (PIR) technology [18] which does not 
disclose the access pattern.                                 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. Protocol Security Proof. 
Theorem 1. The proposed RSC protocol is secure to 
calculate the relevance scores on encrypted indexes and que-
ries in the presence of semi-honest (non-colluding) attackers 
defined in [9]. 
Proof. Since SAD, SMD and KET are subprotocols of 
RSC which have been proved secure in [9] and the transmitted 
data is the ciphertext, the RSC protocol is also secure in the 
presence of the attackers. 
B. Security Goals Analysis 
1) Confidentiality of outsourced data. 
Since the secure indexes are generated using PCTD, the 
file ID, the language tag and the symmetric key are also 
encrypted by PCTD, the confidentiality of outsourced tuples 
is based on the security of PCTD algorithm which have been 
proved in [9]. Since the documents are encrypted by 
symmetric keys generated by a hash function, we base the 
confidentiality of documents on the security of symmetric 
encryptions. Because the symmetric key is protected by 
PCTD, only data users who own the corresponding secret key 
can obtain the symmetric key to recover the documents. 
2) Unlinkability of  Query  
When generating a trapdoor, each keyword and the 
preference scores are separately encrypted using PCTD. 
During the execution of the PCTD encryption algorithm, 
random numbers are chosen to generate the ciphertext. Thus, 
even for the same plaintext, the ciphertexts generated by the 
PCTD encryption algorithm can be different. That is to say, 
even if the data user issues two identical queries, they can be 
transformed into two completely different trapdoors. CP and 
CSP cannot deduce the relationship between two trapdoors. 
3) Privacy-Preservation 
In the query phase, the relevance scores are calculated by 
executing the RSC protocol. Since the security of the RSC 
protocol have been proved in Theorem1, the privacy of the 
relevance scores can be preserved. The top-k results are 
calculated by executing the TOP-k protocol which is proved 
secure in [9]. Besides, all transmitted data are ciphertexts. 
Hence, the privacy of the search algorithm is ensured. CP and 
CSP cannot learn any useful information from the obtained 
results. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION  
In this section , we conduct extensive experiments to 
evaluate the performance of our proposed CLRSE search 
scheme. We implement our scheme on a PC with 3.40GHz 
Intel® Core™ i7-6700 processor and 16.0GB RAM. All 
cryptographic algorithms and protocols are implemented 
using Java language with the Eclipse IDE. For the 
implementation of the query extension, we access the open 
multilingual wordnet corpus through the (Python) Natural 
Language Tool-Kit wordnet interface (NLTK). Then, we 
construct a multilingual database which contains 2048 
encrypted documents and their indexes in Chinese, English 
and other languages. We analyze the  precision of our 
proposed search scheme and compare our scheme with the 
schemes in [19], [9] in terms of functionality and with MRSE 
in terms of efficiency. 
A. Functionality 
TABLE II.  FUNCTIONALITY COMPARISION 
MRSE  
[5] 
PRSE_1 
  [10] 
PRSE_2
[10] 
CLRSE
Multi-keyword 
Search  √ √ √ √ 
Top-k Ranked Search √  √ √ 
Personalized Search √ √ √ √ 
Non-predefined 
Keyword Dictionary √   √ 
    Multi-language 
Search      √   √ 
Semantic extension   √ √ 
Cross-Lingual Search    √ 
B. Precision 
The precision of our proposed scheme indicates whether 
the top-k results meet the data users’ needs. We conduct an 
investigation and randomly choose 100 users of different 
languages to test our system. We set the users’ feedbacks in 
three levels: Satisfaction, Basic Satisfaction and 
Dissatisfaction. The survey results show that about three-fifths 
of the users are satisfied with the search results, and one-fifth 
of the users are basically satisfied.  
C. Efficiency 
1) Document Outsourcing  
In our proposed scheme, the outsourcing of documents 
mainly involves three steps: keyword extraction and weight 
value calculation, security index generation, index tuple 
generation. Since the first step can be completed ahead of 
time, the execution time of document outsourcing in our 
experiment is the sum of the execution time of the other two 
steps.  
We compare the document outsourcing time of our 
CLRSE scheme with the MRSE scheme. Since the execution 
time of all algorithms and protocols are affected by the 
bitlength of N , we set the bitlength of N  in our scheme 
as 1024 to achieve 80-bit security level [20]. The secure index 
generation phase of the two schemes is roughly the same. The 
total running time of this phase is proportional to the number 
of documents and the number of keywords in each document. 
In the third phase, our scheme requires an additional encryp-
tion of language tags which has only a slight impact on the 
document outsourcing efficiency. Fig.2. and Fig.3. show that 
the document outsourcing time of the two schemes are basi-
cally linear with the size of document collection and the num-
ber of 
keywords in a document. The document outsourcing efficien-
cy of CLRSE is roughly equivalent to that of MRSE. 
2) Query 
The query response time is defined to measure the query 
efficiency, which refers to the period from the issue of the 
query request to the reception of the search results. For 
example, the data user specifies four Chinese keywords as the 
original query and attempts to get Chinese and English search 
results with T set to 0.5. Our CLRSE scheme involves an 
additional operation of cross-lingual query construction before 
trapdoor generation. Fig.4. shows that the query response time 
of the two schemes grows linearly with the number of the 
retrieved documents. When k=1, the time cost of our scheme 
is slightly longer than MRSE. However, the time cost of 
MRSE rapidly increases as the number of retrieved documents 
becomes larger. Therefore, when the number of returned 
results required by the user is large, the search efficiency of 
our scheme is significantly higher than that of MRSE.  
Compared to MRSE, our scheme contains an extra process 
of query extension. The time overhead of this part is negligi-
ble. All the time-consuming operations in both schemes hap-
pen in the trapdoor generation phase and the top-k rank search 
phase. In our CLRSE scheme, the size of keyword collection 
in query is larger due to the extension of the original query, 
which will cause an increase of the trapdoor generation over-
head. On the other hand, our scheme filters out the document 
collection of the target languages by language matching which 
can significantly reduce the runtime of the top-k protocol. In 
addition, all protocols running on the CP and CSP can be cal-
culated in parallel which can greatly improve the efficiency of 
the protocol execution. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigated the problem of cross-lingual 
multi-keyword rank search with semantic extension over en-
crypted data and proposed a cross-lingual multi-keyword rank 
search scheme CLRSE using OMW. Our proposed scheme 
made valuable contribution to searchable encryption in that it 
further eliminates the language barriers in searchable encryp-
tion. Additionally, our scheme implemented the flexible key-
word and language preference settings, as well as the auto-
mated calculation of preference. The performance of our 
scheme is evaluated and compared with previous schemes. In 
the future, we will focus on the improvement of the top-k 
search efficiency in our scheme. 
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